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The	UK	government	is	shedding	some	of	its	illusions
about	Brexit,	and	softening	its	position
Step	by	step,	the	UK	government	is	shedding	some	of	its	illusions	about	Brexit,	argues	Holger
Schmieding	(Berenberg).	The	United	Kingdom	has	already	accepted	that	it	will	have	to	meet	the
legally	binding	financial	commitments	it	incurred	while	it	was	a	member	of	the	European	Union
(the	so-called	Brexit	bill)	and	is	going	along	with	the	EU’s	timetable	for	negotiations	(divorce
issues	first,	transition	deal	next,	outlines	of	a	future	trade	deal	last).	Last	Friday	saw	another	set	of
concessions	being	made	by	the	Prime	Minister.	
In	her	speech	at	Mansion	House	last	Friday,	Prime	Minister	Theresa	May	went	one	step	further,	acknowledging	that
the	UK	has	to	face	“hard	facts”	on	Brexit	and	that	“life	is	going	to	be	different	after	Brexit”.	If	we	extrapolate	the	British
learning	curve	into	the	future,	reason	may	still	prevail	in	the	end	with	an	agreement	on	a	“soft”	or	“semi-soft”	Brexit	by
October	2018,	in	time	for	both	sides	to	ratify	it	before	the	UK	formally	leaves	the	EU	on	29	March	2019.	Under	such	a
deal,	the	UK	would	maintain	access	to	the	EU’s	single	market	for	goods	and	for	some	services	on	almost	the	same
preferential	terms	as	before.
However,	Theresa	May	is	not	yet	close	to	such	a	deal	that	would	minimise	the	economic	damage	to	the	UK.	On	the
most	fundamental	level,	May	does	not	yet	seem	to	acknowledge	three	key	facts:
First,	the	medium-sized	UK	earns	12	per	cent	of	its	GDP	through	exports	to	the	EU27	whereas	the	EU27	send
exports	worth	merely	3	per	cent	of	their	GDP	to	the	UK.	As	a	result,	any	deal	will	reflect	the	bargaining	position	of	the
EU	much	more	than	the	wishes	of	the	UK	government.	Of	course,	May’s	plea	that	both	sides	will	need	to	be	“flexible”
to	achieve	a	mutually	agreeable	result	is	not	wrong.	But	almost	all	of	the	flexibility	will	have	to	come	from	her	fragile
and	bitterly	divided	government.	Whereas	a	no-deal	“hard	Brexit”	would	hurt	all	sides,	it	would	hurt	the	UK	much
more	than	the	EU27.
Second,	for	the	EU27,	safeguarding	its	own	cohesion	and	the	integrity	of	its	institutions,	laws	and	regulations	matters
much	more	than	retaining	favourable	access	to	the	UK	market.	The	UK	will	not	get	a	bespoke	deal	that	presents	a
better	balance	of	rights	and	obligations	than	its	current	EU	membership	does.
Third,	as	Ireland	is	the	EU27	country	most	affected	by	Brexit,	the	EU	has	de	facto	granted	Ireland	a	veto	over	the
terms	of	any	deal	on	post-Brexit	relations	which	the	EU27	can	strike	with	the	UK.	If	the	UK	indeed	leaves	the
customs	union	for	goods	and/or	the	common	agricultural	policy,	any	arrangement	to	control	–	or	not	control	–	the
flow	of	goods	across	the	land	border	between	the	two	parts	of	Ireland	will	have	to	be	acceptable	to	Dublin.
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If	we	take	Theresa	May’s	Mansion	House	speech	at	face	value,	the	outlook	would	be	grim.	She	continues	to	rule	out
the	only	known	way	to	avoid	a	hard	border	in	Ireland,	namely	an	arrangement	that	keeps	the	UK	inside	the	customs
union	and	fully	aligned	with	EU	standards	after	Brexit	for	all	goods	that	can	be	easily	transported	across	a	border.
She	also	hopes	to	secure	a	high	degree	of	preferential	access	to	the	EU27	market	for	financial	services	while	gaining
full	control	over	the	movement	of	EU	workers	into	the	UK.	However,	the	best	the	EU27	can	offer	to	a	UK	that	wants
to	leave	the	customs	union,	abrogates	the	free	movement	of	labour	and	rejects	the	jurisdiction	of	the	European	Court
of	Justice	is	a	free-trade	deal	akin	to	that	which	the	EU	has	struck	with	Canada.	That	template	contains	many
provisions	facilitating	the	exchange	of	goods,	for	which	EU27	suppliers	often	have	a	comparative	advantage	over	the
UK,	but	few	provisions	for	services,	for	which	the	City	of	London	is	so	far	often	the	best-placed	location.	In	short,
such	a	deal	could	be	quite	disadvantageous	to	the	UK.	Of	course,	the	UK	and	the	EU27	may	well	strike	a	“Canada
plus”	deal.	However,	the	“plus”	would	most	likely	be	in	continuing	co-operation	in	non-economic	fields	such	as
security	and	defence	instead	of	better	UK	access	to	the	select	parts	of	the	common	market	which	the	UK	likes	most.
The	only	way	to	draw	hope	from	the	Mansion	House	speech	is	to	view	it	as	just	one	of	many	steps	on	the	long	road
from	British	Brexit	illusions	to	an	acceptance	of	reality:	the	UK	government	can	either	insist	on	its	positions	and	suffer
a	hard	Brexit	without	a	significant	deal	with	the	EU	or	accept	the	terms	for	a	preferential	market	access	agreement
that	the	EU	can	offer	–	or	possibly	reconsider	Brexit	once	it	has	become	fully	clear	what	Brexit	will	entail	in	practice.
Over	the	last	six	months,	the	UK	position	has	already	adjusted	while	we	do	not	yet	detect	any	major	shift	in	the	EU
position.	If	Theresa	May	continues	to	ditch	one	illusion	after	the	other,	making	the	UK	position	progressively	more
realistic	without	shattering	her	fractious	government	in	the	process,	the	UK	may	still	end	up	with	the	semi-soft	or	soft
Brexit	that	minimises	the	economic	damage	for	the	UK.
The	chance	that	the	UK	may	reconsider	and	abandon	Brexit	remains	small.	We	put	it	at	no	more	than	10%.	As	the
hard	choices	which	the	UK	has	to	make	on	its	road	to	Brexit	become	more	apparent,	the	case	for	staying	in	the	EU
may	become	stronger.	However,	no	Conservative-led	government	could	and	would	attempt	such	a	U-turn.	The	only
practical	way	in	which	Brexit	could	be	reversed	would	be	if	early	new	elections	swept	a	Labour-led	government	to
power	that	might	possibly	call	a	new	referendum.	The	fear	that	new	elections	could	sweep	Labour’s	hardline	leftist
leader	Jeremy	Corbyn	to	power	is	one	of	the	few	factors	uniting	the	various	factions	of	the	Conservatives.	As	they	go
to	great	lengths	to	avoid	that	risk,	the	most	likely	outcome	is	that	all	factions	of	the	Conservatives	will	continue	to
support	Theresa	May	as	she	stays	on	the	road	to	Brexit,	hopefully	continuing	to	adjusting	her	stance	further	step	by
step	towards	a	softer	version	of	Brexit	over	time.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Dr	Holger	Schmieding	is	Chief	Economist	at	Berenberg	in	London.	
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